PERSPECTIVE – ‘Coconut judge’: When ambiguity becomes misconduct

PERSPECTIVE – ‘Coconut judge’: When ambiguity becomes misconduct

The Kalu Kalu charge, R v. Bentley, and why the LPDC should not sustain it

By Stephen Kola-Balogun

Background

On 11th November 2026, lawyer Kalu Kalu appeared on Channels Television’s Politics Today to discuss Justice Peter O. Lifu’s judgment of 5th November, which nullified the David Mark-led leadership of the ADC and the decisions taken under it. He argued that the judgment did not expressly invalidate Atiku Abubakar’s presidential nomination, and in the course of that argument, he called Justice Lifu a “coconut judge.” The presenter, Seun Okinbaloye, interrupted him and asked him to withdraw the remark, to which Kalu replied: “Because of time, I do withdraw it.”

On 13th November, the NBA President, Oyinkansola Badejo-Okusanya, SAN, forwarded a petition, with the broadcast recording, to the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) for alleged disparaging remarks against a sitting judge. The NBA was careful to add that this is not a finding. Kalu will have a chance to respond. The LPDC will decide. On the material in the public domain, that charge cannot be reasonably sustained, for three reasons: ambiguity, context, and perception.

Ambiguity

What does “coconut judge” mean? The petition appears to proceed on one meaning only: that it is an insult. But “coconut” is a metaphor, and metaphors are ambiguous. In Nigerian speech, a coconut is hard on the outside, hard to crack. A “hard nut to crack” means stubborn, unyielding, unmovable, difficult to persuade. If Kalu meant that Justice Lifu is a hard nut to crack a judge who, once he has taken a view, will not shift that is not a personal insult. That is criticism of judicial temperament and reasoning. Lawyers criticise judgments in strong language every day. That is not misconduct. That is advocacy. The LPDC must prove what Kalu intended, and that the words could only bear an insulting meaning. They cannot. This is the lesson of R v. Bentley (Deceased) [1998] EWCA Crim 2516.

In 1952, Derek Bentley, 19, was on a roof with Christopher Craig, 16, during a burglary. Police said Bentley shouted: “Let him have it, Chris.” The prosecution said it meant: “Shoot him, Chris.” The defence said it could mean: “Give him the gun, Chris” surrender it. The jury adopted the prosecution’s meaning. Bentley, who never fired a shot, was convicted of murder and hanged in 1953, despite the jury’s recommendation to mercy. In 1998, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. Lord Bingham held Bentley had been denied a fair trial. The trial judge had failed to direct the jury properly on the burden of proof, on joint enterprise, and on the possible ambiguity of “Let him have it.” Bentley teaches what applies directly to Kalu: first, words do not have one meaning;

Context

Second is context everything ? Bentley was already under arrest when the words were allegedly spoken, Kalu was in the middle of a legal argument about what the 5th November judgment actually decided; the speaker must be heard on what he meant.

Much has been made of the withdrawal, as if it were a confession. It was not. Read it literally: “Because of time, I do withdraw it.” On live television, time is controlled by the presenter, not the guest. When the presenter says, “Withdraw it,” and the guest says, “Because of time, I withdraw it,” he is saying: I do not have time to explain what I meant, so I will withdraw the phrase to allow the programme to continue. That is not an admission that the phrase was insulting. It is a concession to the clock. To treat a time-pressured withdrawal as proof of guilty intent would repeat Bentley’s error to take a fragment of speech, strip it of context, and give it the worst possible meaning.

The LPDC must allow Kalu to do what television did not: explain in full what he meant. In June 2026, the Court of Appeal described Justice Lifu’s conduct in the ADC deregistration case as “judicial impertinence” and “judicial rascality.” On 28 July, it overturned the deregistration. Those are far stronger words than “coconut.” They were institutional criticism of conduct in a judgment, and they were justified. Kalu is entitled to argue his comment was of the same order: criticism of a judgment, not an attack on the man. The ADC’s question “What has Kalu said that the Court of Appeal has not already said?” is rhetorical, but it makes a serious point about proportionality.

Perception

This charge does not arise in a vacuum. The ADC leadership case began on 2nd September 2025 before Justice Emeka Nwite. It was reassigned to Justice Lifu. The Chief Judge, Justice John Tsoho, explained the reassignment by Nwite’s elevation, but gave no reason why it had to be Lifu. Lifu was already handling the ADC deregistration case. He delivered judgment in it three days after the Court of Appeal stayed it. On 1st June 2026, ADC National Secretary Rauf Aregbesola wrote objecting to the reassignment and expressing lack of confidence in Lifu. The case was assigned to Lifu the next day. On 5th November, Lifu nullified the Mark leadership and its decisions.

That is the sequence that creates the perception of bias not proof of bias, but the appearance that a fair-minded observer would find troubling. And in law, as R v. Sussex Justices ex p Mc Carthy (1923) All ER Rep 233 we are taught that justice must not only be done, but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Kalu was commenting on that sequence, in the heat of the moment, on live television, without time to elaborate. To discipline him for that while questions about assignment and perception remain unanswered by the National Judicial Council risks creating a second perception: that the Bar is quicker to punish the lawyer who complains about the process than to investigate the process itself.

Conclusion

The NBA is right that lawyers must treat courts with respect. The ADC is right that the NBA is not a political party. Both can be true. The way to reconcile them is not to punish ambiguity. It is to hear the explanation. Bentley was hanged on four ambiguous words. It took 45 years to correct that mistake. We should not need 45 years to learn the lesson: when words can bear two meanings, the law must not choose the worse one and punish the speaker for it. If “coconut” means hard, unyielding, a hard nut to crack, then Kalu was criticising a judgment. And criticising a judgment, even in strong language, is not misconduct. It is the duty of a lawyer – R v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118.

• Stephen Kola-Balogun is a Legal Practitioner,
Lagos

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